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8.1 INTRODUCTION
Descartes affords several notions of consciousness as he explains the
characteristics of the diverse features of human thought from infancy to
adulthood and from dreaming to attentive wakefulness. I will argue that
Descartes provides the resources for a rich and coherent view of conscious
mentality from rudimentary consciousness through reflexive consciousness
to consciousness achieved by deliberate, attentive reflection. I shall begin by
making two general yet important remarks concerning the conceptual start-
ing points of my investigation.
First, in interpreting early modern notions of consciousness, it is impor-
tant to notice that conscious thought is often deemed as self-relational
involving reflexivity understood as a more or less attentive relation to self.1
I will deploy the terms ‘conscious’ and ‘consciousness’ in reference to a
wider array of experiential phenomena than that of self-consciousness,
1 The self-relative aspect of consciousness is often emphasized in passages which are
closest to being definitions of consciousness or in which the significance or larger
theoretical role of it is addressed. Consider the following. Ralph Cudworth (True
Intellectual System of the Universe (London, 1678), 159) says that “Consciousness
[. . .] makes a Being to be Present with it self, Attentive to its own Actions, or
Animadversive of them, to perceive it self to Do or Suffer, and to have a Fruition or
Enjoyment of it self”. John Locke (An Essay Concerning Human Understanding
(London, 1690), II, 27, 9) maintains that “consciousness always accompanies think-
ing, and it is that which makes every one to be what he calls self, and thereby distin-
guishes himself from all other thinking things”. The author of An Essay on
Consciousness (Two Dissertations Concerning Sense, and the Imagination with an
Essay of Consciousness (London, 1728), 144–145) gives a definition according to
S. Heinämaa, V. Lähteenmäki and P. Remes (eds.), Consciousness: From Perception to Reflection
in the History of Philosophy, 177–201.
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since I believe it is mandated by Descartes. Sensory perceptions of external
and internal senses, imagining, doubting, understanding, affirming,
denying, willing are examples of conscious phenomena (See Second
Meditation AT VII, 28; CSM II, 19; Third Replies AT VII, 176; CSM II, 124;
Sixth Meditation AT VII, 76–77; CSM II, 53).2 This list includes very sim-
ple sensations as well as highly rational operations of the mind – only
through them can we establish a relation to the self. Common to all these
various phenomena is that they are experiences or appearances in the first
person-perspective. Descartes says that “these [phenomena] all fall under the
common concept of thought or perception or consciousness, and we call the
substance in which they inhere a ‘thinking thing’ or a ‘mind’” (Third Replies
AT VII, 176; CSM II, 124). Considering himself as a thinking thing
Descartes finds it certain “that there can be nothing within me of which I am
not in some way aware” (First Replies AT VII, 107; CSM II, 77).3 As is well
known, on the one hand, Descartes narrows the notion of soul or mind to
what has traditionally been called rational soul and maintains that those
functions of organisms which used to be referred to vegetative and sensitive
souls can be explained solely on mechanical principles. On the other hand,
he widens the scope of what belongs to (rational) soul’s realm to include also
(passive) sensations in so far as they are regarded as appearances to mind,
not merely as bodily events.
According to Descartes, animals do not have souls, and because thought
and consciousness can inhere only in ensouled beings, animals are deprived
of thought and consciousness. It has been argued, however, that Descartes
does not maintain that animals do not have feelings and sensory perceptions
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which “Consciousness [. . .] is that inward sense and Knowledge which the mind hath
of its own being and Existence, and of whatever passes within itself, in the use and
Exercise of any of its Faculties or Powers [and] knows that it is it self (i.e. its own actual
Being) which Thinks, Perceives, & c”. However, it is clear from their texts that none of
the mentioned authors subscribe exclusively to a concept of consciousness involving
the self as an object.
2 References to Descartes’ work are to Œuvres de Descartes, 12 vols., edited by
Charles Adam and Paul Tannery (Paris: Vrin, 1964–1976) (cited as AT).
Translations from The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, 3 vols. Vols. 1–2 edited
and translated by J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff and D. Murdoch (cited as CSM I and
CSM II), Vol. 3 with A. Kenny (cited as CSMK) (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1985–1991).
3 My emphasis. Descartes’ formulation ‘in some way’ is noteworthy in allowing dif-
ferent ways of being conscious.
at all.4 There is textual evidence that supports this conception. For instance
in his letter to Henry More, Descartes says that “I do not [. . .] deny sensa-
tion [to animals], in so far as it depends on a bodily organ” (AT V, 278;
CSMK, 366),5 and even more explicitly in his letter to the Marquess of
Newcastle: “Since the organs of their [i.e. animals’] bodies are not very dif-
ferent from ours, it may be conjectured that there is attached to these organs
some thought such as we experience in ourselves, but of a very much less
perfect kind” (AT IV, 576; CSMK, 304), and to Fromondus: “Animals do
not see as we do when we are aware that we see, but only as we do when our
mind is elsewhere” (AT I, 413; CSMK, 61). In this chapter, I refrain from
taking a pronounced position in the dispute whether Descartes – especially
in light of his conception of matter and mechanism – could viably attribute
feelings and sensations to animals in any non-metaphorical sense of subjec-
tive experiences.6
It is sufficient for the current topic that, in light of the earlier quotations,
we can see that Descartes is at least not a straightforward eliminativist
on animal sentience. It should be thus clear that through his agnosticism on
animal experientiality, he recognises an attenuated sense of awareness that
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4 Gaukroger, Stephen, Descartes: An Intellectual Biography (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1995), 288; Alanen, Lilli, Descartes’s Concept of Mind (Cambridge, MA and
London: Harvard University Press, 2003), 101. See also Morris, Katherine, “Bêtes-
machines”, in S. Gaukroger et al. (eds.), Descartes’ Natural Philosophy (London and
New York: Routledge, 2000), 401–419. Morris holds that on Descartes’ view animals
can feel but not think. However, she holds also that Descartes’ concept of sentience
is very different from ours. See note 7.
5 The qualification “in so far as it depends on a bodily organ” seems to suggest a read-
ing that animals do not, after all, have sensations as experiences in the first-personal
mode. Namely, given Descartes’ dualism and his conception of matter and mechanism
it is far from evident whether there could be anything it is like for animals to have
sensations when sensations depend solely on bodily organs. However, see note 6.
6 I am sympathetic to Stephen Gaukroger’s view, according to which Descartes does
attribute sensations to animals and that thus it is misleading to say that, on
Descartes’ account, animals have no experiences whatsoever. According to
Gaukroger, animal automata are unlike such mechanical constructions as clocks
even though also animals’ functioning, including genuine perceptual cognition, “can
be described wholly in mechanical terms; in particular, no separate mental substance
need be invoked, and nothing other than completely inert matter need be invoked”.
This is because, Gaukroger explains, on Descartes’ account “addition of degrees of
complexity brings with it significant qualitative differences – emergent properties”
(Gaukroger 1995, 288).
does not presuppose a direct conceptual link to the characteristics of the
“traditional rational soul” nor to conscience which ties the idea of moral
responsibility together with one’s awareness of one’s mental states.7 When
pressed by his critics, I shall argue, Descartes attributes such an attenuated
sense of consciousness to infant thought. As acknowledged, given the mate-
riality of animals it is disputable whether Descartes can ultimately grant any
kind of awareness to animals. But we do not have a similar question about
infants since, as opposed to brutes, infants have souls. The essential ingredi-
ent is thus lacking for the dispute over the possibility of infant awareness
to even rise. Moreover, everyday experience testifies that infants have the
potentiality to later gain more refined ways of becoming conscious.
The second remark concerns a slight but noteworthy distinction between
two ways of understanding reflexivity. According to a metaphor, conscious-
ness is like a light which, in addition to illuminating its object, illuminates
itself. The idea of “illuminating an object”, i.e. to be conscious of x, is
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7 Cf. Baker, Gordon and Morris, Katherine, Descartes’ Dualism (London and New
York: Routledge, 1996), 99–100. Baker and Morris’ interpretation includes a claim
that for instance the idea of pain merely as something that hurts is non-sensical
since, according to them, for Descartes human beings are “‘geometrically excluded’
from having a ‘What’s it like?’. There is in [Descartes’] framework no such thing as
(nothing counts as) an inexpressible form of thinking”. Morris (2000, 403) further
holds that in general the “seventeenth-century concept of sentience” is such that in
it “‘what’s it like?’ had no part whatsoever [. . .]. Rather the conception was linked
to responsiveness to stimuli”. So according to Morris (2000, 404), Descartes’ quest
was to dispel his contemporaries’ resistance by explaining animals’ subtle respon-
siveness to their environment by bringing out the details of anatomy and mechanics:
“against neo-Aristotelians, Descartes argued that sentience (as they understood it,
not as we understand it) could be fully explained mechanistically, with no need for
a sensitive soul”.
Gaukroger says that even though humans have sensory experiences (such as sensa-
tions of pain, hunger and thirst) “the fact that we are capable of reflection and judge-
ment completely transforms the nature of our experience, even when we are not
reflecting and making judgements about it” (1995, 351). I agree with Gaukroger that
capability to reflect and judge is distinctive of human thought and the nature of our
experience is transformed in the sense that for Descartes the ‘I’ who has these experi-
ences can only hardly avoid experiencing hunger as hunger or pain as pain. Feelings
of hunger and pain would be quite different for a creature capable only of direct sen-
sory experiences and powerless in coming to regard those feelings as something. This
means, however, that there are two different types of experience which, I will show,
are recognized by Descartes.
intelligible only in so far as x is illumined for somebody. In other words,
consciousness is always given to itself, or reveals itself to itself, besides being
about something else. In this experiential sense of reflexivity, consciousness
can be regarded as essentially reflexive. I take reflexivity, so understood, to
be a minimal condition of what it means to have conscious thoughts.8
From this use of ‘reflexivity’, I distinguish another. The same terminology
can be used in what we may call a structural sense, i.e. in analysing the inten-
tional structure of consciousness. Structural reflexivity does not refer to the
phenomenal givenness of consciousness but to such relations pertaining to
consciousness which are not, as such, revealed in the occurrent experience.
In such case, a phenomenally unified experience is underlain by a relation.
This means that a description given in terms of such a relation, i.e. a relation
which is within or between mental operations and which is not readily
revealed in the occurrent experience, is a theoretical description of how a
thought comes to be conscious, or what goes on behind the scenes, as it were,
when we are immediately conscious of something.
This contrast between how a conscious thought is experientially given to
the subject and the intentional structure of a conscious thought is endorsed
by Descartes himself. Descartes claims that a single thought, for instance a
thought with a content “an astonishing machine” can involve in fact two
perceptions: perception of the machine and perception of the initial percep-
tion. The latter, which he calls “intellectual perception”, is responsible for
the feeling of amazement intertwined with the perceptual experience of the
machine. Even though there is a relation between two distinct perceptions,
the thought is experientially unified. Namely, according to Descartes, these
perceptions “occur together and appear to be indistinguishable from each
other” (Letter to Arnauld, 29 July 1648 AT V, 221; CSMK, 357). The
thought “an astonishing machine” thus appears to the subject of experience
as internally unified, and it fails to reveal to her the fact that it involves two
distinct mental operations. Due to his conceptual distinction, Descartes is
able to analyse such a unified appearance as in fact being constituted by two
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8 As Gaukroger rightly notes (1995, 288) there are general difficulties in characteris-
ing experiential states which are different from ours. It will be shown later that
Descartes regards the awareness associated with infants’ thoughts differently gener-
ated than that of adults’ thoughts. This difference, according to my interpretation,
amounts to infants’ being incapable of coming to regard the objects of their percep-
tual states as perceptual states, or the object of such a state as the certain object (or
the certain kind of object) it is. But this does not have to mean that infants’ percep-
tual states would not be given in the mode for-somebody.
separate operations of the mind. This means that philosophical scrutiny can
provide us knowledge about the intentional structure of consciousness, even
though the structure remains concealed from the subject at the time of
undergoing the experience. We thus have two approaches to one phenome-
non: the perspective of the thinking subject undergoing an experience and
the perspective of a philosopher who is able to reveal the intentional struc-
ture of experience by examining the nature of thought. To be clear, I do not
claim that the latter perspective is radically separated from the former.
Rather, it seems that the latter is founded on the former. Descartes’ point is
simply that for us humans it is difficult to see what sort of mental operations
(and their mutual relations) are involved in our everyday thinking.
As concerns the terminology of reflexivity, there is also the notion of reflec-
tivity proper, in which the person is the active agent that does the reflecting
deliberately. The result of such deliberate, attentive, personal-level reflec-
tion is the third type of Cartesian consciousness. The second type I call
‘reflexive consciousness’ in which reflexivity is automatic, as described ear-
lier, and which is characteristic of adult thinking. The first, most elementary,
type will be called ‘rudimentary consciousness’ which includes reflexivity
understood as the givenness of the occurrent experience. It is the character-
istic thinking mode of infants, the sick and the tired, and often pertains to
dreaming during sleep. Through recognition of these types, I hope to con-
tribute to a more resolute and comprehensive understanding of Descartes’
conception of consciousness.
These distinctions are tenable on their own, I believe, but they are also
partly motivated by the technical problem of infinite regress which threatens
a theory that regards consciousness exclusively as a result of a relation
between two separate mental operations. In his objections, Hobbes intimates
that the threat rises with Descartes’ account,9 for Descartes explicitly main-
tains that “we cannot have any thought of which we are not aware at the
very moment when it is in us” (Fourth Replies AT VII, 246; CSM II, 171). If
consciousness is itself taken as one mode of thinking, i.e. as a separate act
of thought, Descartes is committed to infinite regress because, as a thought,
consciousness would have to be an object of yet a further consciousness, and
so on infinitely.
In Section 8.2, I compare Richard Aquila’s and Udo Thiel’s illuminating
readings of Descartes and show that they provide two seemingly incompat-
ible views concerning Descartes conception of consciousness. To prepare the
resolution of these seemingly conflicting positions, I introduce Descartes’
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9 See the second objection of the third set of objections AT VII, 173; CSM II, 122.
view of deliberate attentive reflection. I will show that consciousness as
thinking of thinking is not his only notion of consciousness. In Section 8.3,
I examine the central passages that provide the textual evidence for my expli-
cation of the three types of consciousness in Descartes and argue that my
explication incorporates the central ideas of Aquila’s and Thiel’s. In Section
8.4, by making use of the conclusions from the Section 8.3, I present the
problem of infinite regress and show how it resolves in light of the distinc-
tion into three different types of consciousness. In Section 8.5, I compare my
interpretation with Daisie Radner and Michael Radner’s view with the pur-
pose of showing that my interpretation of Descartes’ conception of con-
sciousness is compatible with theirs, but supplements it in an important way.
In Section 8.6, I discuss the relation of reflexive consciousness to attentive
reflection.
8.2 CONSCIOUSNESS AS THINKING OF THINKING
Let us take a look at some views held by recent commentators and some pas-
sages from Descartes himself in order to see that his discussion of con-
sciousness inspires a wide diversity of interpretations. Udo Thiel claims that
Descartes draws no distinction between the meaning of ‘consciousness’ and
‘individual reflection’.10 By ‘individual reflection’ Thiel means the process of
observing or considering one’s own mental states.11 His reading emphasises
that Descartes maintains a view of consciousness as achieved through think-
ing of thinking. As a result, his view winds up suggesting that for Descartes
there are no other ways of acquiring experiential mental states, multifarious
as they come. Even the simplest state of consciousness would then be
achieved by considering one’s previous or simultaneous thoughts.
Richard Aquila maintains a different view. He claims that Descartes’
notion of consciousness comes down to an idea of a single operation which
is at once directed at itself and at an external object.12 Aquila argues that
even if it would be correct that Descartes believes that we are conscious of
external things by virtue of some second-order perception of the initial
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10 Udo Thiel (“Hume’s notions of consciousness and reflection in context”, British
Journal for the History of Philosophy 2, 2 (1994), 91) uses the term ‘individual’ in
order to distinguish it from what he calls ‘philosophical reflection’ which is a yet
higher-order notion. For instance, individual reflection can be a means to carry out
a project of philosophical reflection.
11 Thiel 1994, 85.
12 Aquila, Richard E., “The Cartesian and a certain ‘poetic’ notion of conscious-
ness”, Journal of the History of Ideas 49, 4 (1988), 544.
perception of the external object, this second perception must, nonetheless,
be “somehow one with the first”.13 He sees Descartes going as far as to
propose an identification of “inner-directed consciousness and a [. . .] cog-
nition or perception of which it is a consciousness”.14 Aquila does not pur-
sue the question of how we should understand this kind of identity, namely
how we should understand that these two seemingly different things some-
how collapse together and constitute one conscious thought.
In other words, Thiel maintains that consciousness results from the
subject’s explicit consideration of her thoughts, where the act of reflecting is
clearly a distinct thought from the thought reflected on. But Aquila claims
that although in some sense there were two mental operations that together
constituted consciousness, these are not really distinguished from each other
by Descartes but rather identified as one. Later I will reconcile between these
two views for I intend to show that Descartes’ conception of consciousness
is wide enough to envelop the insights of both of these views.
Robert McRae distinguishes between three interrelated notions: thought,
consciousness, and reflecting or attending to one’s thoughts. He argues that
in Descartes’ theory, thought is not identical or synonymous with con-
sciousness, simply because “being conscious of whatever exists in us is not
the same as thinking of what exists in us”.15 Thinking and consciousness
must be distinguished from each other because Descartes explicitly main-
tains that consciousness is something that always accompanies all presently
occurring thinking. Hence the thought by which one reflects and the
thought which is reflected on, must already be conscious. Therefore, there
must be at least one sense of consciousness which does not result from
attending to one’s thoughts, and consciousness identified with the act of
reflection proper must thus be distinguished at least from this sense of con-
sciousness. On the face of it, a passage from Descartes’ conversation with
Burman seems to question this interpretation:
It is correct that to be aware is both to think and to reflect on one’s thought.
But it is false that this reflection cannot occur while the previous thought is
still there. This is because [. . .] the soul is capable of thinking of more than
one thing at the same time, and of continuing with the particular thought
which it has. It has the power to reflect on its thoughts as often as it likes,
and to be aware of its thought in this way. . . (AT V, 149; CSMK, 335)
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13 Aquila 1988, 546.
14 Aquila 1988, 547.
15 McRae, Robert, “Descartes’ definition of thought”, in R.J. Butler (ed.), Cartesian
Studies (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1972), 57.
As McRae rightly notes, in this passage ‘to think’ is used differently from what
Descartes takes thinking to be when he states that we cannot have any thought
of which we are not aware at the very moment when we have it. It seems that here
thought is not treated as something of which we are always conscious, for
what is stated suggests that being conscious presupposes not only thinking but
reflecting on one’s thinking. This is not what Descartes maintains, however. It
is important for us to see that Descartes replies here to Burman’s concern
about the temporality of relating to one’s thoughts by other thoughts:
Burman asks whether it follows from Descartes’ characterisation of thought
that one cannot be aware that one is thinking but only that one was thinking.
Burman’s question concerns thinking of thinking rather than nature of con-
sciousness in all its manifestations (ibid.). Descartes’ reply is simply that one
can have the original thought and simultaneously reflect on that thought and
thus be aware that one is presently having the thought. It is crucial that he
claims that this is because mind has the “power to reflect [. . .] as often as it
likes”. He treats reflection here as a higher-level mental operation, as a sepa-
rate act invoked by the subject and based on her power to do so which enables
her to be conscious of her thought “in this way”. Interpreting the passage thus
does not at first sight align with Descartes’ commitment to automatic accom-
paniment of consciousness to thought. But as mentioned already, the tension
disappears when we understand the passage as not being about the more
pervasive types of consciousness at all but about our reflective capabilities as
persons, about deliberate attentive reflection in particular.
Descartes’ reply to another objection, one presented by Bourdin, helps fur-
ther to see that consciousness acquired through deliberate attentive reflection
is not his only notion of consciousness. Bourdin challenges Descartes by
claiming that to establish the superiority of the incorporeal substance, it is
not sufficient to contend that thinking makes it superior to matter. He claims
that the superiority of the incorporeal is due to occurrence of explicit reflec-
tive acts, i.e. thinking of thinking. Descartes denies that this is the case:
The initial thought by means of which we become aware (advertimus) of some-
thing does not differ from the second thought by means of which we become
aware that we were aware of it, any more than the second thought differs
from the third thought by means of which we become aware that we were
aware that we were aware. (AT VII, 559; CSM II, 382; my emphasis)
The importance of this explication for our present purposes is that we
become aware of something already by the initial thought. Descartes
stresses that all the successive thoughts are similar in kind. The fact that the
object of my thought happens to be another thought, as opposed to an
external object, does not make this second thought special as a thought since
it has no relevant property that the first thought would lack. For conscious
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thought, it is not necessary that one thought is rendered conscious by
another thought. We are conscious already by having one thought.
In his question, Bourdin also voices the suspicion that perhaps Descartes
himself really maintains the reflection-view which has been maintained by
many through ages, namely “I think, I am conscious of thinking, therefore
I am a mind” (AT VII, 534; CSM II, 364). But this is not Descartes’ view. The
core of his answer lies in how ‘conscious of thinking’ is understood: he does
not deny that consciousness is what distinguishes mind from matter, but by say-
ing that the initial thought is enough to grant the superiority of mind over mat-
ter he sets consciousness as a property of a single thought. “If it is conceded
that a corporeal thing [e.g. a brute animal] has the first kind of thought”
(AT VII, 559; CSM II, 382), which is what Bourdin suggests (AT VII, 534;
CSM II, 364), we will commit a dangerous error because “then there is not the
slightest reason to deny that [matter or certain compositions of matter] can
have the second [act of thought]” (AT VII, 559; CSM II, 382), since the first
and second acts of thought are similar in kind. For this reason, reflection can-
not be the differentiating feature between corporeal things and incorporeal ones.
Descartes sees it as simply fallacious to suppose that to become aware of
something requires employing an explicit reflective act (ibid.). In another
context, he expresses the same idea by saying that when we think of our
thoughts there is an “internal awareness which always precedes reflective
knowledge” (Sixth Replies AT VII, 422; CSM II, 285). This, of course, does
not rule out the possibility that we can think about our thinking by means of
other thoughts and be aware of them also in this way, but it must be distin-
guished from the internal awareness preceding reflection.16 The discussion in
this section leads us to ask and inquire whether Descartes provides resources
for a more detailed analysis of the internal awareness involved in all thinking.
Let us next concentrate on types of consciousness which are more elementary
than consciousness acquired through attentive reflection.
8.3 RUDIMENTARY AND REFLEXIVE CONSCIOUSNESS
We can find many passages which impel distinctions into different types. The
first passage crucial to my argument for distinguishing between rudimentary
and reflexive consciousness is in Descartes’ reply to Arnauld. Here he explains:
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16 See also Discourse on the Method where Descartes states that “many people do not
know what they believe, since believing something and knowing that one believes it
are different acts of thinking, and the one often occurs without the other” (AT VI,
23; CSM I, 122). It is clear that this does not prevent these people from being
conscious of something whenever they believe something.
[T]he first and simple thoughts of infants are direct and not reflexive [. . .].
But when an adult feels something, and simultaneously perceives that he has
not felt it before, I call this second perception reflection, and attribute it to
intellect alone, in spite of its being so linked to sensation that the two occur
together and appear to be indistinguishable from each other. (Letter to
Arnauld, 29 July 1648 AT V, 221; CSMK, 357)
This is an intriguing passage which merits a central role in my interpretation.
This is because here Arnauld has pressed Descartes to explicitly consider the
differences between the natures of infant and adult thought. We can see from
Descartes’ answer that infants lack the capability of “reflex thought” but they
have “direct thoughts”. Descartes affirms that “the mind begins to think as
soon as it is implanted in the body of an infant, and [. . .] it is immediately
aware of its thoughts, even though it does not remember this afterwards
because the impressions of these thoughts do not remain in the memory”
(Fourth Replies AT VII, 247; CSM II, 171–172). Thinking thus begins already
in the mother’s womb where humans feel “pain, pleasure, heat, cold, and other
similar ideas” (Letter to Hyperaspistes AT V, 149; CSMK, 189–190). There is
no doubt that Descartes regards also direct thought as conscious and that this
rudimentary consciousness can be involved in perception without occurrence
of the kind of reflexive relation that Descartes associates with adult thought.17
The reflexive relation pertaining to adult thought consists of the second
perception taking the initial perception as its object, and this reflexivity
results in presenting the initial perception under some particular feature. In
the quoted example, the feeling is perceived as new.18 It is noteworthy, how-
ever, that Descartes does not claim that reflex thought is inevitably involved
in grown-up thinking but rather maintains that adults, in distinction to
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17 In The Passions of the Soul (see AT XI, 327ff.; CSM I, 328ff.) Descartes classifies
different passions (i.e. perceptions) according to their cause. As regards our topic,
there is no reason to assume that perceptions of different kinds of objects would
involve relevant differences in how we come to be aware of the perceptions.
18 Anne A. Davenport analyses the role of the intellectual perception as follows:
“Material things that are known in sensation do not include as a feature their nov-
elty relative to the mind: there is nothing in the patch of red that impinges on my
retina that says that I have or have not experienced it before. Consequently, the intel-
lect itself must supply the index of ‘novelty’ to any sensation that I experience for
the first time” (“What the soul remembers: Intellectual memory in Descartes”, The
New Arcadia Review 3 (2005), 4). “Novelty” is obviously not the only feature which
things apprehended in sensation do not include in themselves. The same can be said
of a number of features under which a perception itself or an object of perception
appears to the mind.
infants, are capable of it.19 This contention finds support from Descartes’
explanation in his letter to Gibieuf: “I believe that the soul is always thinking
for the same reason that I believe that light is always shining, even though
there are not always eyes looking at it [. . .]” (AT III, 478; CSMK, 203). He
then points out that “every night we have a thousand thoughts, and even
while awake we have a thousand thoughts in the course of an hour” (ibid.).
Each and every one of our thoughts during dreaming and all the countless
thoughts we have while awake hardly contain second-order perceptions
which would present each and every perception under some feature.20
By maintaining that the mind always thinks in one manner or another,
Descartes subscribes to the view that there are a variety of degrees of
consciousness between which we continually vacillate. In somewhat more
technical terms this means that we can be conscious by having direct thoughts
and by having reflex thoughts. Infants form an exception as they do not have
the capability of such reflex thought as described earlier.21 Adults, on the other
hand, are capable of both kinds of thinking.22 As Descartes denies non-
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19 Alison Simmons (“Changing the Cartesian mind: Leibniz on sensation, representa-
tion, and consciousness”, The Philosophical Review 110, 1 (2001), 31–75) is one to draw
a distinction between these two types of consciousness. She calls them phenomenal and
reflective consciousness. She describes the phenomenal (my rudimentary) conscious-
ness, by saying that it “affords an experience in which things are phenomenally present
to the thinking subject”. By ‘phenomenal presence’ she means that experiences are
something felt by the subject of consciousness, “there is something it is like to think this
or that”. Reflective (my reflexive) consciousness differs from rudimentary conscious-
ness as regards experiential content. In reflective consciousness things are also consid-
ered as something: as new, remembered, etc. Reflexion adds something to experience
(Simmons 2001, 36).
20 As we will see later, volitions are nevertheless always accompanied by second-
order, intellectual perceptions.
21 In Letter to Arnauld, 4 June 1648, Descartes writes that we cannot remember our
early sensations: “For that we would have to observe that the sensations which come
to us as adults are like those which we had in our mother’s womb; and that in turn
would require a certain reflective act of the intellect, or intellectual memory, which
was not in use in the womb” (AT V, 192–193; CSMK, 354).
22 To my knowledge Descartes nowhere explicitly affirms or denies that adults some-
times think like infants. He, however, regards our perceiving being sometimes similar to
that of brutes. He states that animals do not see as we do when we are aware that we
see, but as we do when our mind is elsewhere (See Letter to Plempius for Fromondus AT
I, 413; CSMK, 61). This supports the present claim in so far as Descartes intends the
seeing of animals as an experience in the first-personal mode, regardless of how slight
or confused an experience he might think of it.
conscious modes of thought, this means furthermore that rudimentary con-
sciousness minimally belongs to every presently occurring thought.
This much is relatively clear about Descartes’ replies to Arnauld, but the
response merits further attention. Remember that in this account he charac-
terises the adult’s awareness as being by virtue of a second perception which
is so closely linked to its object “that the two occur together and appear to be
indistinguishable from each other”. It is important that even though Descartes
treats the second perception here as numerically distinct from the first, he
immediately points out that they are closely joined elements constitutive of a
single experience. It is furthermore noteworthy that also the second percep-
tion, which Descartes attributes “to intellect alone”, is a passion (of the soul)
and thus as automatic or inevitable as the first perception. The novelty asso-
ciated with the first perception in Descartes’ example would not have been
revealed to the subject of experience had not the second perception occurred.
This description of reflexivity differs drastically from the notion of reflex-
ivity in the Burman quote. It is common to both of these notions of reflexivity
that the second act or perception does not necessarily accompany every ini-
tial perception. But, as we noticed, in the conversation with Burman
Descartes emphasises the mind’s power to reflect as it likes, while according
to the notion of reflexivity that we have been examining in this section the
occurrence of a second perception does not depend on any deliberate act.
What we have here is an intellectual perception of a logically prior but tem-
porally simultaneous perception which occurs as a byproduct of the initial
perception. Together they afford a phenomenally unified experience to
which reflexivity pertains in an inconspicuous way. This type of experience
is something quite typical for us, albeit not the only type.
Reflex thought, as it has been characterised in this section, is not literally
a matter of practising acts of mind, since perceiving is passive, and not active.
Therefore it is worthwhile to examine whether Descartes has any different
account of how consciousness comes about in mind’s actions proper, i.e. voli-
tions. Descartes provides two noteworthy insights about willing and con-
sciousness associated with it. Firstly, he maintains that we cannot will anything
without having understanding of what we will. We are thus inevitably aware
of what our willing is about. In a letter to Regius, he explains the difference
between activity and passivity of the mind by saying that:
Understanding is the passivity of the mind and willing is its activity; but
because we cannot will anything without understanding what we will, [. . .]
we do not easily distinguish in this matter passivity from activity. (Letter to
Regius AT III, 372; CSMK, 182)
An act of will has an object. According to Descartes, we are aware of that
object, since, as he says, we have some understanding of it. This passage does
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not convey whether Descartes presumes that understanding of what we will
is by virtue of a numerically distinct perception. On the one hand, it could
well be pointed out that regarding something as a passion or an action is only
a matter of terminology for Descartes and that therefore in this passage will-
ing and understanding are not really two distinct things but only two aspects
of a single thing. On the other hand, understanding can take place in the
absence of willing which implies that they should be treated as being separate.
Furthermore, in considering the characteristics of adult thought in contrast
to infant thought Descartes is explicit in stating that there are two operations
where the first-order operation is perceived by the second. Therefore, I opt for
a reading that follows the model made explicit in the case of adult perception,
i.e. involving two connected but numerically distinct mental operations.
Following the case of adult perception, we have here an act of will which
occurs together with an intellectual perception. As Descartes states in this
passage, our understanding concerns especially the object of the act of will.
As will be shown later, the act of will reveals itself as an act of will, but
understanding of the object of will is not achieved by the single act alone.
Descartes stresses here again that it is not easy to distinguish the perception
concerning what our willing is about from the act of will. He concedes, again,
that they make up a unified appearance. The case of being aware of what we
will and the case of adult perception in the reply to Arnauld are similar in the
respect that both cases involve an intellectual perception. They differ in two
respects however. First, here one of the mental operations is an act of will
whereas in the reply to Arnauld both are perceptions. Second, an intellectual
perception does not accompany every first-order perception, but it is impossi-
ble to ever execute an act of will without having understanding of what we will.
So far it seems that reflexive consciousness has fairly clear-cut character-
istics in terms of its intentional structure. Matters get a bit more compli-
cated when we take a look into Descartes’ view that we cannot will without
knowing that we will. This is not the same as being aware of what we will,
i.e. of the actual object of will, since here willing is considered as something
by which we are aware of the mental operation itself.23 It is noteworthy that
Descartes accounts for our awareness of the act itself even though he is clear
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23 The expression ‘to be aware that one wills’ amounts to saying that, when one wills,
the willing is experienced as willing. The experience is thus readily categorized as a
certain kind of thought. It is also important to see that this cannot happen without
the subject of willing, as it were, owning the act. This does not mean a full-blown
self-consciousness but it is to acknowledge that any thought (in so far as it is con-
scious) must be for a subject.
that our willing is always intentional in the sense that we cannot will with-
out thereby being aware also of what we will. The following is the next
crucial passage for my argument. Descartes says:
I claim that we have ideas not only of all that is in our intellect, but also of
all that is in the will. For we cannot will anything without knowing that we
will it, nor could we know this except by means of an idea; but I do not
claim that the idea is different from the act itself. (Letter to Mersenne, 28
January 1641 AT III, 295; CSMK, 172)
We know that we will whenever we will, i.e. we are aware of our willing
through the act of will itself. I do not wish to dwell on the debates of what
is the proper understanding of the Cartesian notion of idea. It is safe, and
enough for the present purposes, to say that Descartes holds the following
views. (i) We can, and always do know our acts of will only by means of an
idea. (ii) This idea is not different from the act of willing. He thus employs
both a distinction and identification between act and idea. In yet other
words, Descartes is saying that we should not regard our being aware that
we will as a result of an operation of mind distinct from the act itself
because everything happens within the single act.24 Unlike in the two cases
of reflexive consciousness considered earlier, here we have a case of only one
act which thus has an internally complex structure. There are two things
going on at once: the actual willing (of something) and awareness of the act
of willing itself.
In this way, we can see how one act can be about something and also
grasped by itself as the particular kind of act it is. We must be careful in
distinguishing this from how Descartes explains passive adult thought. He is
after all very clear in his reply to Arnauld in distinguishing between the ini-
tial and second perceptions. Indeed, this distinction is the very basis of the
difference between the natures of infant and adult thought, as we saw earlier.
Similarly, we must be careful in distinguishing “being conscious that we
will” from “being conscious of what we will”, since the latter involves two
distinct operations. An act of will alone would not be a similar means of hav-
ing understanding of the object. This must be expressed in the conditional
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act of the intellect, or objectively as the thing represented by that act (AT VII, 8; CSM
II, 7). We can notice that the present interpretation concerning the fact that an act of
will reveals itself does not depend on in which sense Descartes applies ‘idea’ here. If it
is in the latter sense, the thing represented by the act is the act itself. If it is in the for-
mer sense he just identifies ‘act’ with ‘idea’. In that case they become interchangeable
and we are entitled to say that act is known by means of the act itself.
because, as Descartes maintains, an intellectual perception always accompa-
nies the act of will. Therefore, the account given of being aware that we will
is about something that never in actuality occurs alone because willing
always involves understanding. The descriptions Descartes gives of our
awareness that and what we will are thus complementary elements in
explaining both how we get to be conscious of our thoughts, and what kind
of experiential content these acts have.
What about rudimentary consciousness, typical of infant thought, which
seems to be by virtue of a single perception involving no reflexivity? We
seem to lack an account of how it comes about. One way to resolve this is
to consider the account given of the intentional structure of our awareness
“that we will” as applying also to rudimentary consciousness. Namely, in the
quoted passage Descartes generalises upon what he says about our being
aware of our acts of will to everything that is in our intellect. Even though
perceptions depend on the mind–body compound, they are affairs of the
mind as sensations proper. Descartes is quite clear about this. For example
in Optics, he explains that bodily events “which, acting directly upon our
soul in so far as it is united to our body, are ordained by nature to make it
have [. . .] sensations” (AT VI, 130; CSM I, 167), and a little later he elabo-
rates that “it is the soul which sees, not the eye” (AT VI, 141; CSM I, 172).
Sensations are, as it were, the end products of chains of bodily events and in
this sense they pertain to the mind alone.
Therefore we may regard the same inherent reflexivity that pertains to
acts of will, as such, to pertain to perceptions also. Thus, when we perceive
something we are aware of our perception similarly through an idea as we
are aware of our act of will. This model would then apply to thinking of
infants also, i.e. of how rudimentary consciousness comes about. What
would still be lacking is the experiential addendum that would be brought
about by an accompanying intellectual perception – which always accom-
panies volitions and typically perceptions (of adults). I wish to point out
this line of reasoning without arguing for it however. This is because,
admittedly, Descartes’ considerations on the nature of infant thought are a
somewhat special case, and it may be that he would not be inclined to
analyse infant perception analogically to acts of will. If that is the case,
then one has to remain content with noticing that rudimentarily conscious
thought is primitively so, allowing no account of how this consciousness
comes about. Fortunately, as regards unravelling the three types of con-
sciousness in general, this is not a detrimental shortcoming.
Finally, I believe that the differences between how consciousness is asso-
ciated with perceiving and willing by Descartes can be explained by the fact
that willing, since it is an activity, presupposes more maturity and liberty of
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mind than that of being a passive percipient. We should consider Descartes’
observation in his letter to Hyperaspistes:
[W]e know by experience that our minds are so closely joined to our bodies
as to be almost always acted upon by them; and although when thriving in
an adult and healthy body the mind enjoys some liberty to think of other
things than those presented by the senses, we know there is not the same lib-
erty in those who are sick or asleep or very young; and the younger they are
the less liberty they have. [I]t seems most reasonable to think that a mind
newly united to an infant’s body is wholly occupied in perceiving in a con-
fused way or feeling the ideas of pain, pleasure, heat, cold and other similar
ideas which arise from its union and, as it were, intermingling with the body.
(AT III, 424; CSMK, 189–190; my emphasis)
In a similar manner, Descartes explains that “in the mind of an infant there
have never been any pure acts of understanding, but only confused sensa-
tions” (Letter to Arnauld, 4 June 1648 AT V, 192; CSMK, 354; my empha-
sis). Lack of liberty in infants and in the sick limits the ways in which they
can come to be conscious. As a consequence, there are obviously limitations
in what types of conscious states they can have: liberty or capability to
be concerned with something other than what is presented by the senses
means that one can execute acts of will and think about one’s thoughts and
consequently be conscious of thoughts also through volition and reflection.
As I have argued, Descartes regards the conscious states achieved through
volition and attentive reflection as clearly different types from rudimentary
consciousness, and from each other, since he gives different explanations of
how these conscious states are generated in the mind.
In the light of what I have argued in this section, we can finally reconcile
between Thiel and Aquila. The considerations on intentional structure of con-
sciousness, the discrepancy between it and the phenomenal givenness of con-
sciousness, and finally the consequent exposition of different types of
consciousness provide grounds for preserving the central tenets of both Thiel’s
and Aquila’s views. We do not have to choose between the central convictions
of their positions but we can, and in my view we indeed should, incorporate the
spirit of Aquila’s claim with that of Thiel’s. Namely, we can assimilate Aquila’s
claim that Descartes considers the second mental operation which takes the
first mental operation as its object as somehow one with the first with Thiel’s
insistence that “Descartes distinguishes between the act of reflection itself
and the thought which is the object of reflection”.25 They are both right in
their claims. The cases considered in this section show that two operations
can make up a phenomenally unified experience. In this sense, there is
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identification. However, from another perspective, as a single thought can
involve a relation underlying the unified appearance, there is clearly a distinc-
tion involved. Moreover, although Descartes holds that we can acquire
consciousness through attentive reflection it is not the only way of being con-
scious. My reading thus incorporates Thiel’s and Aquila’s views to the extent
that it accommodates two central elements of Descartes’ conception of con-
sciousness which they tend to see as exclusive of one another.
8.4 THE THREE TYPES OF CONSCIOUSNESS 
AND INFINITE REGRESS
According to what Descartes says in the passages considered so far, we are
impelled to grant that he has a relatively complicated account of consciousness.
Firstly, we can recognise three different types of consciousness which roughly
go together with different kinds of thinking: consciousness involved in infants’
perceptions, consciousness that comes about through intellectual perception of
an initial perception or an act of will, and consciousness acquired through
deliberate attentive reflection.26 The first type is rudimentary consciousness
which is minimally involved in all thinking. The second type is reflexive con-
sciousness. Reflexive consciousness comes about in acts of will because they
always involve understanding. An intellectual perception does not always
accompany an initial perception, however. This is the case in infants’ percep-
tions and often in sickness and tiredness as well as in dreaming. But when an
intellectual perception occurs together with the initial perception (itself suffi-
cient for rudimentary consciousness) having the initial perception as its object,
this also constitutes a case of reflexive consciousness. The third type of con-
sciousness is a result of attentive reflection, whereby a person explicitly and
deliberately thinks about her thoughts, attends to them, or considers them.27
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26 Overall, existence of different senses or orders of consciousness should not strike
us as peculiar. See, for instance, the introduction of this book for John Maxwell’s
1727 exposition of several senses of consciousness: “reflex act”, “direct act”, “the
power or capacity of thinking”, “simple sensation”, and “the power of self-motion,
or of beginning motion by the will”.
27 Further support for the distinction between rudimentary and reflexive conscious-
ness can be found from Descartes’ discussion about the three grades of sensory
response in the Sixth Replies (AT VII, 436–438; CSM II, 294–295). The first grade
involves only stimulation of bodily organs, i.e. mechanical movements. The distinc-
tion between second and third grade is drawn so that the second grade includes the
immediate effects in the mind which arise from the intimate union of mind and body
and which do not properly involve the intellect (such effects being pain, pleasure,
hunger, sound, taste, heat, etc.). The third grade concerns things outside us and, in
particular, our judgements about those things. Descartes says that when we make
These distinctions of the intentional structure of consciousness are natu-
rally related to the issue of how the different types of consciousness should
be understood as appearances to mind, as lived through experiences. As is
clear, for Descartes the mind always thinks and its thinking is always con-
scious. Then minimally, thoughts are experientially present for the mind.
Sometimes perceptions are accompanied by secondary perceptions which
have the initial perceptions as their object. This reflexivity adds something to
the experience: things are experienced under some feature, but the fact that it
is due to an accompanying perception is not revealed in the experience as
lived through by the subject. And always, in willing, acts of will reveal them-
selves as acts of will and are accompanied by intellectual perception which
enriches the experiential content by contributing knowledge about the object
of willing. The third sense of being conscious established by Descartes is
through attentive reflection when a person deliberately attends to her own
already conscious thoughts. This is thinking of thinking in the most typical
sense and it can afford rich and articulate content, and also result in self-
knowledge and self-determination. One more noteworthy distinction is that
in Descartes’ categorisation willing and attentive reflection belong to a dif-
ferent category than passive perceptions, since for him they are mental
activities essentially independent of the body. Nonetheless, it is worth stress-
ing that persons ultimately have the capacity for self-determination which
presupposes the capability to attend to and consider one’s thoughts in a
thorough manner.
Let us now briefly look into the problem of infinite regress to see how it, for
its part, motivates the distinctions into the three types of consciousness. To
avoid regress Descartes would have to deny the assumption that for thinking
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some certain judgement for the first time we are more inclined to attribute the judge-
ment to the intellect, and thus treat the sense-perception and the judgement as two
distinct operations. Supposedly this means that we either come to notice that a
judgement is involved in addition to the sense-perception or we more or less pur-
posely make the judgement about the thing represented in the sense-perception. But,
mistakenly in Descartes’ view, we tend to refer judgements to our senses when there
is nothing new in the sensation. In such cases, we make the judgement so quickly
that we do not distinguish the judgement from simple sense-perception. This dis-
tinction between second and third grades of sensory response resembles Descartes’
statements about the difference between the natures of infant and adult thought: the
former lacks the participation of the intellect, whereas a judgement (or, intellectual
perception) is often involved in the latter but in such a way that the fact that there
are two operations involved remains concealed from the subject of thought.
However, we can come to notice our automatic judgements, as well as we can delib-
erately reflect on our thoughts.
to be conscious, every thought would require a distinct thought directed at it.
On the other hand, he would obviously not want to commit himself to the
view that no thought can be taken as an object of another thought. At first
sight he seems to be liable to infinite regress: First, according to him there is
no presently occurring thought which is not conscious. Second, in his conver-
sation with Burman he says that to be aware is both to think and to reflect on
one’s thought. A way out is to deny that in his reply to Burman he explicates
the only possible manner of being conscious. Then it will not follow from his
definition of thinking that in order for a thought to be conscious it requires
yet a further thought directed at it, and ad infinitum.28
It is undeniably Descartes’ view that consciousness can be associated with
attentive reflection and be brought about by explicitly thinking about one’s
previous or simultaneous, but yet separate thoughts. But as we have seen, it is
not the only view Descartes maintains about consciousness. For him con-
sciousness does not necessarily require reflexivity in the sense of involving a
relation of distinct acts of thought. Such concept of non-reflexive conscious-
ness is most directly presented in his comments on the nature of infant
thought where he states that infants are capable of direct but not reflex
thought. What infants lack compared to adults, in Descartes’ understanding,
is not rudimentary consciousness but a specific kind of consciousness which
categorises the present thought as a certain kind of thought. Moreover,
infants also lack the capability to consider or attend to their (already con-
scious) thoughts. Even more importantly, as regards the vicious regress,
Descartes maintains that also an act of will primitively involves awareness of
itself through built-in self-referentiality even though it is always accompanied
by an intellectual perception.
On top of all this, thinking which involves reflexive consciousness, be that will-
ing or (adult) perceiving, can be analysed from two perspectives. On one account,
reflexive consciousness requires occurrence of two distinct mental operations. As
I have argued, there is also another viable account presented by Descartes,
according to which this is an analysis of the intentional structure of conscious-
ness underlying the unified appearance. Descartes nowhere indicates that the
accompanying intellectual perception should itself be rendered conscious by yet
a further perception. This is because he regards appearance that results from the
compound of two operations as a single conscious thought.
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28 Hobbes points out this problem by claiming that even though “someone may
think that he was thinking (for this thought is simply an act of remembering), it is
quite impossible for him to think that he is thinking, or to know that he is knowing.
For then an infinite chain of questions would arise” (AT VII, 173; CSM II, 122).
8.5 REFLEXIVITY AS INTENTIONAL STRUCTURE OF
CONSCIOUSNESS AND AS PHENOMENAL GIVENNESS
My reading that there are three types of awareness in Descartes challenges
certain accounts presented in recent Descartes scholarship. Daisie Radner
and Michael Radner have dealt with the issue of reflexivity associated with
Descartes’ conception of consciousness. I agree with them in emphasising
that Descartes is clear that also infant thought is accompanied with con-
sciousness, and that infant thought is on a par, for instance, with passing
dreams of adults.29 But I argue that their interpretation does not provide a
complete enough account of Descartes’ conception. I believe it neglects the
fact that Descartes has a say on the relations between and within mental
operations which are not manifest in how our thoughts appear to us, and
that Descartes also treats actions and passions differently. Therefore, Radner
and Radner’s interpretation must be related to the passage where Descartes
actually draws the distinction between infant and adult thought30 and in
which he characterises the latter in terms of intellectual perception accom-
panying a first-order perception. It is also important to remember the con-
siderations in the passages where Descartes argues that we cannot will
without knowing that and what we will. These passages provide the grounds
for my interpretation that Descartes holds a view concerning what I have
called the intentional structure of consciousness.
Radner and Radner strive to present a comprehensive characterisation of
Descartes’ understanding of consciousness. They claim that humans, includ-
ing infants as well as sleeping adults, are conscious in the sense that “there
is only one act, the act of thinking of x, which has x as its primary object
and itself as secondary object. Object x is primary in the sense that it is,
properly speaking, what I am thinking about or what my thought is directed
toward. The act reveals itself along with this object as a kind of by-product,
albeit an essential one”.31
They consider this characterisation of consciousness as excluding only the
type of consciousness that is achieved through attentive reflection. Radner
and Radner’s formulation of Descartes’ view does not discriminate between
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Prometheus Books, 1989), 35.
30 As noted earlier, sometimes adult thought is similar to infant thought, as sometimes
in dreaming. By ‘adult thought’, I will in this section refer to what is characteristic of
it in distinction to infant thought, i.e. that it can be reflexively conscious.
31 Radner and Radner 1989, 29. See also Radner, Daisie, “Thought and
consciousness in Descartes”, Journal of the History of Philosophy 26, 3 (1988), 446.
rudimentary and reflexive types of consciousness. Their account does not
(and does not purport to) take notice of the underlying intentional structure
which is the basis for the distinction between them.
The purpose of my distinction between rudimentary and reflexive con-
sciousness is not to claim that rudimentary consciousness as an occurrent
experience would not be for someone alongside with what the experience is
primarily about (experiences do not just float around!), but primarily to
point out that Descartes gives different accounts of the underlying structure
of these different types of consciousness. So even though we may regard also
rudimentary consciousness involving reflexivity in the sense that it is for a
subject, this kind of reflexivity must be distinguished from reflexivity
pertaining to intentional structure of consciousness.
If we fail to do this and operate only with the notion of reflexivity in ref-
erence to appearance or phenomenal givenness of consciousness, Descartes’
account of adult thought as involving intellectual perception accompanying
an initial perception, and his view of acts of will which involve understand-
ing of what we will, do not fit into the framework. As we have seen, Descartes
is explicit that the two operations occur together and appear to be indistin-
guishable from each other. These two mental operations together thus con-
stitute a unified appearance. In the light of this fact, we can see that adult
thought cannot be analysed through the notion of reflexivity embraced by
Radner and Radner, because Descartes is explicit that the relation is between
two distinct mental operations, whereas Radner and Radner argue that there
is only one operation. Descartes articulates that in adult thought there are
two, albeit intertwined operations precisely in the purpose to show how adult
thought differs from infant thought.32 Second, adult thought cannot be
regarded as an instance of attentive reflection either, since it is clear that the
kind of reflexivity it involves is not subordinated to voluntary control.
Therefore, Descartes’ conception of consciousness cannot be exhausted by
the notions of reflexivity as phenomenal givenness and attentive reflection.
As mentioned, this disagreement is not fundamental. Radner and
Radner’s description of Descartes’ view is correct in so far as it is taken to
state that thinking reveals itself along with its primary object to the subject
of experience. This can be safely said of both rudimentary and reflexive
consciousness. But in its neglect of what Descartes says about relations
which do not reveal themselves to the subject undergoing the experience,
their description fails to recognise the differences between rudimentary and
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response and how the third grade involves two distinct operations.
reflexive consciousness. As mentioned, even though phenomenal givenness
is a minimal condition for all consciousness, reflexive consciousness carries
richer experiential content than rudimentary consciousness. It categorises
thoughts as certain kinds, presents them under some feature, or involves
understanding of the object.
8.6 RELATION OF REFLEXIVE CONSCIOUSNESS 
TO ATTENTIVE REFLECTION
There are also other recent views that focus on the notion of consciousness
understood particularly as self-relative, but I believe they also understand
‘reflexivity’ in reference to the fact that for Descartes all thinking as it were
reveals itself to itself. According to Lilli Alanen, Descartes’ notion of con-
sciousness includes inherent reflexivity, which does not require a “distinct
and secondary awareness having the primary awareness as its object”.33
Alanen sees such reflexive consciousness as a form of self-consciousness,
although not in the sense of being consciousness of a self, but rather con-
sciousness’s awareness of itself. She holds that consciousness understood in
this way is “the kind of awareness accompanying thought in Descartes’ wide
sense [of thought]”. In other words, reflexive consciousness is “what
Descartes regards distinctive of human thought” in general.34 This is on a
par with what has earlier been said about reflexive consciousness.
This sense of consciousness is very important in understanding the nature
of attentive reflection. Namely, reflexive consciousness is presupposed in a
person’s capability to reflect and to control one’s thoughts.35 Similarly to
Alanen, Robert McRae insists that, according to Descartes, by virtue of
consciousness, thoughts are present to the mind in such a way that attention
can capture them. He expresses this by saying that, for Descartes, attentive
reflection is not a steerable “light beam” which illuminates its object, but
ORDERS OF CONSCIOUSNESS IN DESCARTES 199
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of instances of consciousness. It is worthwhile to notice that it would also make the
notion of deliberate attentive reflection altogether futile, given Descartes’ own defini-
tion of thinking, where consciousness necessarily accompanies thought. Thus second-
ary consciousness would have to be, besides properly distinct from the primary, also
necessarily generated. Except for Descartes’ own definition of thought as always con-
scious there seems to be no other reason to think that the problem of infinite regress
would arise in so far as the secondary act is subordinated to mind’s power to invoke it,
as is asserted in the Burman quote.
34 Alanen 2003, 100.
35 See Alanen 2003, 101.
“possible only if the object is already in the light”.36 Also in a similar vein,
Stephen Gaukroger maintains that it is characteristic of human sense
perception that it “involves an awareness of one’s perceptual states as per-
ceptual states, whereas animal sense-perception does not”.37
I agree with these scholars with the qualification that infants form an
exception (together with animals, perhaps), for as we saw, there is a period
of time when one’s mind is wholly occupied in perceiving in a confused
manner or feeling pain, hunger, cold, etc. And in his letter to Hyperaspistes,
Descartes takes the same to hold for those who are asleep or sick.38 Even
though the confused perceptions and feelings certainly qualify as conscious
experiences, it is not indicated by Descartes that these states include aware-
ness of them as some kind of states. To be able to attend to the content of
one’s thought the content (or, the object) of thought must be readily appre-
hended as something. Similarly, reflection on our mental operations them-
selves presupposes them as already apprehended as the certain kind of
thoughts they are: as doubting, seeing, feeling, etc. As by virtue of rudi-
mentary consciousness the thought is (merely) phenomenally present to
the mind, it is difficult to see how reflective attention could be directed at
the thought without it being reflexively conscious, i.e. already categorised as
something. Remember Descartes’ assessment about infants: in the mind of
an infant there are only confused sensations and no reflexive acts,39 and
those creatures who can be only rudimentarily conscious also lack the capa-
bility to attentively reflect on their thoughts.40 Liberty and maturity of the
mind bring with them the conceptual categorisation of the acts and contents
of perception and volition.
I will not get involved with the question of animal awareness here, but we
should notice that Descartes considers the difference, or rather the sem-
blance, between animals and infants: “I should not judge that infants were
endowed with minds unless I saw that they were of the same nature as
adults; but animals never develop to a point where any certain sign of
thought can be detected in them” (Letter to More, 15 April 1649 AT V, 345;
CSMK, 374). Infants acquire the ability of real speech, to name one certain
sign, but there is a period of time when their lives do not notably differ from
that of animals. While it is a matter of dispute whether Descartes grants
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36 McRae 1972, 70. McRae uses the expression ‘reflective attention’.
37 Gaukroger 1995, 349.
38 See AT III, 424; CSMK, 189–190.
39 Letter to Arnauld, 4 June 1648 AT V, 192; CSMK, 354.
40 See Letter to Hyperaspistes, August 1641 AT III, 424; CSMK, 189–190.
animals awareness of some kind or degree, he is clear that infants, ensouled
beings that they are, are conscious. As I have argued, in its lack of reflexive
relations which would inconspicuously categorise thought as something, the
rudimentary consciousness pertaining to infant thought is best understood
as phenomenally given to the mind. Rudimentary consciousness is the foun-
dation for reflexive consciousness which, for its part, is prerequisite for our
capability to deliberately reflect on our thoughts.
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